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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH
00O00

JACK B. PARSON CONSTRUCTION
CO., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

:
:

v.

No. 19673

THE STATE OP UTAH, by and
through the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:

Defendant-Respondent.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:

Third-Party PlaintiffRespondent,
:
v.
THE AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY
CO.,
Third-Party Defendant- :
Appellant.
00O00

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
BY RESPONDENT
00O00

Respondent accepts the statement of Issues Presented
by the Appellants1 Petition and hereafter responds to them.
Respondent has raised the issue as to whether the
Court's decision to overturn the Lower Court's ruling as to
Sheets 2B of the Plans and 44 of the Special Provisions is
correct.

Respondent submits as stated hereafter that the con-

clusion of the Trial Court is otherwise correct.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent accepts Appellants' Statement for the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
purpose of this
proceeding.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rather than challenge or alter the Statement of Facts
set forth by Appellants,' Respondent has elected to refer to
pertinent facts as part of its argument.

It is true as alleged

by Appellants that the Court in a few instances has misstated
factual matters.

Any misstatements of facts in the Court's

Opinion which are considered material are covered in argument
herein.

There is a comprehensive Statement of Facts in

Respondent's Brief covering 21 pages.

This is reproduced and

included in an appendix to this Brief for reference.

Any factual

representations made in this Brief are believed to be covered in
said Statement of Facts, including citations to the record.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In holding that UDOT's Plans and Specifications
affirmatively misrepresented site conditions, this Court's
April 1 Opinion is in error.

The Court violates its own oft-

repealed rule that it will not disturb factual determinations if
there is evidence in the record to support the ruling of the
Lower Court.

[Thorn Construction Co. v. UDOT, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah

1979) being one such case.]

Points cited by this Court in

support of its ruling as to the misleading character of Sheet 2B
of the Plans and Sheet 44 of the Special Provisions were all
argued by counsel and fully considered by the Trial Court.

There

is substantial credible evidence to support the rulings of the
Lower Court.

The Court in its opinion recognizes the obligation

of Appellant to conduct a reasonable, prudent site visit.

This

same standard should apply to Appellants' review of the Plans and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Specifications.

The best that can be said in Appellants1 behalf

is that the Plans and Specifications are incomplete.

This

imposes a duty of inquiry on Appellants consistent with industry
practice.

Other bidders on the project were aware of local

common knowledge or had firsthand experience in the area.
Appellants would now have this Court penalize these contractors
for this greater knowledge and experience which resulted in their
higher bid prices due to anticipated problems which Appellants
failed to perceive.
misplaced.

The reliance of the Appellants on Thorn is

Verbal representations in this case are exactly

contrary to those in Thorn.

The Project Engineer assigned to the

subject project and the Project Engineer on an earlier project
both stated that Appellants were cautioned by them that gradation
compliance had been a problem for earlier contractors.
Appellants ignored these verbal warnings, whereas in Thorn the
contractor was permitted to rely on an oblique verbal statement
by a low-level employee that the material "could be used".

The

legal principles in Thorn do not apply otherwise in this case.
The Court's Opinion should be modified to make it
consistent with the Trial Court's decision.

The Trial Court was

better placed to decide whether the Plans and Specifications were
"misleading" in the context of the evidence.

This determination

requires a comprehensive understanding of the facts which the
Trial Court possessed.
Respondent has not breached the contract.
written information which is factually correct.

It provided

Information

supplied describes two materials sources both used successfully
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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by other contractors along with selected data concerning the
sites.

The failure of the contractor to produce a satisfactory

product was related to contract performance and lack of care, and
not to information supplied by Respondent.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED ON SHEET 2B OF THE
PLANS AND SHEET 44 OF THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS
IS NOT MISLEADING TO A COMPETENT CONTRACTOR
The law i s c l e a r t h a t i n o r d e r f o r a c o n t r a c t o r

to

p r e v a i l on a t h e o r y of m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n he must i n e s s e n c e prove
two t h i n g s :

(1) t h a t he was " a c t i n g r e a s o n a b l y and was m i s l e d by

i n c o r r e c t p l a n s and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s " a s t h e C a l i f o r n i a Court s a i d

in Souza & McCue Construction Cot v, Superior Court, 57 cal.2d
508, 370 P.2d 338 (1962), to which t h i s Court has in Thorn Cons t r u c t i o n Co, v, UDOTr supra, added t h a t a pre-bid verbal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can also be construed t o mislead a c o n t r a c t o r , and (2)
t h a t he has v i s i t e d the s i t e of the work and made a reasonable
i n s p e c t i o n and i s accountable for anything which i s obvious from
such s i t e v i s i t .

(Mojave E n t e r p r i s e s v. U . S . , 3 CI. Ct. 353,

The dispute in t h i s case, unlike Thsxja,
p r i m a r i l y the adequacy of w r i t t e n information.

involves

Verbal informa-

t i o n was r e l a t e d by UDOT's Engineer Mecham to Parson's agent
Wilson of p o s s i b l e gradation problems.

Wilson denied the

warning, but t h e T r i a l Court apparently placed some r e l i a n c e on
Mecham1s v e r s i o n of the telephone conversation.

The conversation

i s e x a c t l y opposite t o Thorn in t h a t i t warns of a possible
problem.

There was an e a r l i e r verbal warning t o Wilson about the

limestone p i t s on t h e San Rafael by Eldred Swapp, a r e t i r e d UDOT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
- 4OCR,
- may contain errors.

Project Engineer, whose testimony went unrefuted at trial and
which also put Appellants on some duty of inquiry.
The fact that the tests in Pit 2 found on Sheet 2B of
the Plans were mostly taken in 1969 in a location previously
excavated apparently troubles the Court.

Aerial photographs in

evidence taken prior to construction in or around Pit 2 show an
exposed rock mass.

(It is within the right-of-way of the now

existing 1-70 freeway.)

The 1969 tests were taken several

hundred feet south of existing 1-70 at points in this rock
formation.

The one subsequent test described on Sheet 2B was of

the same rock mass north of the 1-70 roadway but still within the
right-of-way limit.

The later test confirmed the 1969 tests, and

they were included for information purposes.

In a properly

conducted site visit a competent contractor should recognize that
the material where the 1969 tests were conducted had been
removed.

Later tests which the Court makes reference to as

indicating that the material "might be marginal" were taken in a
location west of the existing pit and would represent another
"layer in the cake" which is apparent in photographs and
testimony which was before the Trial Court.
Indications of potential problems in crushing required
materials are evident in the test results.

One contractor stated

that he anticipated "easy crushing" because the L.A. Rattler test
results indicate soft material.

Test results with a range of

hardness between 30 and 39% should alert a contractor to expect
to produce an excess of fine-sized materials.

The pits were

"limestone ledge rock" as contrasted with a typical alluvial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deposit and required blasting to remove material. Appellants1
blasting left much harder, better rock in fragments too large for
its crushing system which further reduced the quality of material
produced.

"Overburden" was an obvious problem not recognized by

Appellants.
The pit evaluation report for an earlier Project which
recommended that Pit 2 not be used for future road projects was
fully explained by Eldred Swapp, the Engineer, who stated he knew
of no available material any better than the two sources on Sheet
2B.
The State had substantial information covering two
earlier projects and a foundational geological study in two large
bound volumes.

The question isnft that the State was "selective"

in what it chose to display on Sheet 2B, as the Court notes,
obviously it was.

The question rather is, did the information on

Sheet 2B accurately reflects the material in the pit?

The

conclusion of the contractors who testified, Eldred Swapp and
Jerry Mecham, the UDOT Engineers who worked on Pit 2 projects, a
Geologist employed by the Utah Geological & Mineral Survey, and
materials engineers for UDOT, was in the affirmative.
Given the expressed attitude of the contractor as to
the capability of its equipment to produce the desired product at
the time it bid the project and the failure of Wilson and
McDonald to recognize difficulties evident to other contractors
and their own more experienced company personnel, it is highly
questionable whether Appellants would have altered their bid had
they seen and examined all available UDOT data concerning Pit 2.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court's Opinion discusses the misrepresentations
concerning the "two designated prospects" and refers to the
"suitability of the borrow" in the prospects. (To set the record
straight only Prospect 2 is at issue.

There was no evidence

concerning Prospect 1 being anything other than as represented.)
Prospects 1 and 2 are not "borrow pits".

A "borrow pit" is a

generic source of highway embankment or fill material, all of
which is usable.

Rather, Pit 2 is an "aggregate source"

containing materials which had been tested and passed for use in
the production of crushed rock to be later incorporated into a
bituminous mixture.

The source is "acceptable in general", a

term commonly used in the construction industry, since not all
materials in the pit can be used to produce "aggregate".
Respondent reiterates that its representations on
Sheets 2B of the Plans and 44 of the Special Provisions are not
misleading when properly interpreted as is expected from a
reasonable, competent contractor.
Pit 1 was always available for use by Appellants, and
the BLM property north of the right-of-way fence was made
available to Appellants very early in the project.

Evidence

before the Court indicated Pit 1 to be a better quality source
than Pit 2, and the BLM property contained the same formation
successfully used by earlier contractors without the layer of
"overburden".
Respondent respectfully submits that Sheet 2B is not
misleading.

It may be incomplete as Don Killmore, the Area

Engineer for the Federal Highway Administration testified at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trial, in which case Appellant had a duty to inquire further
and examine records referenced in the Special Provisions.

Both

Wilson and McDonald knew what records are kept, where they are
kept, and how to obtain them.
The problem in this case is the contractor's inability
to perform, not the alleged difficulties in the plans and
specifications.

Appellants are attempting to shift the con-

tractor's responsibility to Respondent.
This Court has said in the case of Nielsop v. ChinEsien Wang, 613 P.2d 515 (Utah, 1980), that "... the evidence and
all inferences that fairly and reasonably might be drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment
entered."

(Also citing Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.2d 205, 381 P.2d

86 (1963); and Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176
(1961).

Legal conclusions by the Trial Court are heavily

dependent on close issues of fact.
IIPARSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY FAILED TO
PERFORM A COMPETENT PRE-BID S I T E
INVESTIGATION, AND THE COURT'S DECISION
TO SUSTAIN TEE TRIAL COURT IN THIS REGARD
I S CORRECT.

Respondent agrees with Appellants as to their
allegations in their Point III that the Court has partially based
its decision on a site visit made following the opening of bids.
This, however, actually strengthens the Court's decision and the
fundamental contention made by Respondent that Appellants1
approach to the project from bid preparation through performance
lacked competence as explained hereafter.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There were two site visits by Appellants prior to the
commencement of any construction operations.

One performed prior

to bidding by McDonald and Wilson who prepared Appellants1 bid.
McDonald1s testimony was impeached at trial on whether Appellants
in fact relied on Sheet 2B of the plans.

(His Deposition

statement was that they did not rely on Sheet 2B, whereas at
trial his testimony was directly contrary.)

Testimony concerning

the first site visit is therefore questionable and self-serving.
The first site visit was not accompanied by any UDOT employee,
unlike other bidders on this project.
The second site visit occurred after the bid opening
and was made by Jack Parson Sr., the company founder, and its
chief materials superintendent.

Jerry Mecham, UDOTfs Project

Engineer, accompanied this second visit which included Prospects
1 and 2.

Mecham was asked if there were any restrictions on the

depth of removal in Pit 2 since the rock formation which earlier
contractors had worked in and which was evident on the north and
east side of Pit 2 was visible under other material on the east
side of the pit.
During this second site visit the unrefuted statement
of Jack Parson Sr. to the materials superintendent was overheard
by Mr. Mecham.

The statement was that, "it looks like Mont has

bought us another one", and was understood by Mr. Mecham to mean
that Wilson had mistakenly bid the job.
The lack of competence with which Appellants conducted
their first site visit is evident when the following evidence is
considered, all of which was before the trial judge:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

The warning by Eldred Swapp to Wilson that the

limestone pits would generate an excess of fine material and had
required use of a sand filler.
2.

Parson (Wilson and McDonald) was unfamiliar with

the area of the project and had never worked in that part of the
State*
3.

Parson never inquired who the contractors were that

had used the pit on previous 1-70 projects as referred to in
Sheet 44 of the Special Provisions.

(While there is no require-

ment to do this, all the other bidders knew who they were and
were aware of conditions they encountered.)
4.

No contact was made, even by telephone, with UDOT

materials personnel prior to bidding.
5.

Parsons elected not to do any drilling or

excavation prior to bidding.

The pit was already open, faces

showing the material strata visible and the roadway cut
paralleling the east part of the source could be viewed.

No

competent contractor could ask for better site information.
This Court has earlier considered a contract requiring
a site visit which charges a contractor with knowledge of
conditions apparent from such visit and apparently approved such
provision in the case of Allen-Howe Specialties v. UtS» Const*
Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980).
The reason for requiring a prospective bidder to visit
the site of the work prior to submitting a bid is to advise a
bidder as to things which are already obvious.
U.S., 424 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1970)].

[See Mandel v.

A bidder must be held to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the standard of that which a prudent bidder should customarily
use in making a judgment regarding the quantity, quality, and
methods of performing the particular work at the particular time
and place.

[See Charles T. Parker v. U.S., 433 F.2d 771 (Ct. CI.

1970)] .
There are a number of cases wherein contractors have
been denied relief either under "changed conditions" provisions
where contracts have contained them or in cases alleging
misrepresentations by the owner based on conditions which were
"unknown", "unusual", or "not recognized" at the time of bidding.
The common thread running through these cases is that the bidder
is expected to possess a certain level of knowledge, competence
and experience and is not allowed to recover from an owner for
the lack of such.
Some typical cases are as follows:

In the Appeal of

Call Construction Co., ASBCA 7627, 62 BCA 3590 (1962).

Here, the

board rejected a claim for difficulties caused by seepage at a
job site in a reclaimed swamp area.

The Board reasoned that soil

and water characteristics were to be expected.
Brothers, Inc., DOT CAB No. 71-15, 73-1 BCA

In Husman

1[ 9889 (January 26,

1973) , the board held that a contractor failed to realize the
laws of nature and should have known "the type of soils, the
climate and that 'pumping1 or capillary action of water in that
type of soils is a common problem."

In Leal v. U.S., 276 F.2d

378 (Ct. CI. 1960) the Court denied a claim and specifically
noted that other contractors raised questions in the bid process

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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about certain water conditions.

The Court felt with such

evidence, conditions at the site and information provided to the
bidders, it was reasonable to expect the encountered conditions.
(The Court specifically found that furnished plan data would
indicate to an experienced operator the existence of water.

Such

conclusion supports Respondent's contention that UDOT furnished
data contained no surprises regarding difficulty in producing
desired gradation of the aggregate to an experienced bidder since
a high wear test (L.A. Rattler) percentage would indicate a high
level of waste in fine sized material.)
Courts have also held that if conditions in the work
are commonly known, and the contractor fails to inform himself of
those conditions, he has not established a claim.

[Biggers

Construction Co, Ins,, EBCA No. 46-4-79, 81-1 BCA % 14,848 at
73,316 (Dec. 19, 1980)]

(Soil make-up and compaction diffi-

culties in soils west of Idaho Falls, Idaho, are not unknown or
unusual and contractor failed to inform itself of these conditions.)

Also, Husman Brothers, Inc., DOT CAB No. 71-15, 73-1 BCA

% 9889 (January 26, 1973), holds that the contractor is held to
what is "common knowledge", and the Court stated as follows:
We must consider pertinent
climatological, hydrological and geological data and all other relevant
and probative evidence about the
geographical area involved. The
contractor is held to a standard of
knowledge of ordinary usual conditions
in a particular geographical area.
Courts and Boards have held that such a contractor is
chargeable with knowledge of local conditions at the job site
which is readily obtainable from local contractors on request.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(Appeal of Daymar, Inc., DOT CAB 77-13, 78-1 BCA 12903 (1977).
In this case, a Nebraska contractor was presumed to be aware of
conditions in Montana that were matters of local common
knowledge.
The problem of soft rock and excessive waste in gravel
pits in Southeastern Utah is common knowledge to contractors and
residents in that area.

The behavior of limestone and its

tendency to reduce to a fine consistency when handled and
subjected to crushing is "common knowledge" in the industry
according to trial testimony.

The inherent difficulty in

handling materials which have been blasted, such as in Pit 2, was
explained by expert testimony at trial.
Appellants are responsible for their lack of knowledge
as to local conditions and the consequences of their aggregate
production operations.
III.
APPELLANTS ELECTED TO DEFAULT THE CONTRACT
AND ARE LIABLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH
DECISION
Appellants argue in their Petition for Rehearing that
the Court's Opinion is a determination that UDOT breached the
construction contract.

Appellants cite the case of Admiral

Plastics Corp, v. Trueblood, Inc., 436 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1971)
as authority for the proposition that where both parties have
breached the contract, neither party is allowed to recover
contract damages.

The ruling of the Court is actually much

narrower than Appellants represent.

The central issue in the

case was, who was at fault for ordering a wrong component part
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for a machine?

The Court did not decide who was at fault, but

found both parties did not act in good faith and that as a result
there was a mutual rescission of the contract.

This case is not

in point since the good faith of Respondent is obvious in its
attempts to resolve the dispute between the parties.

When

Respondent could not agree to meet the excessive demands of
Appellants, the Appellants elected to default the contract.
Assuming Respondent had in fact breached the contract, Respondent
could have elected to perform and recover its damages later.

By

electing to default the contract, Appellants assume responsibility for Respondent's increased costs if it cannot prove that
Respondent materially breached the contract.

The law does not

favor allowing a party to fail to perform a contract, see Green
v. Palfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215 (1946).

This Court has

held in the case of R.C. Tolman Constr. Co. v. Myton Water
Association, 563 P.2d 780 (Utah, 1977), that deficient plans and
specifications entitle a contractor to recover extra cost if
conditions are different than represented or reasonably to be
anticipated.

This does not justify Appellants1 default in

performance and Respondent should be entitled to recover its
damages in any event.
Appellants further argue that their unilateral mistake
of fact as to the quality of the material in the pits was
affirmatively caused by Respondent.

It was Appellants1 own

negligence or lack of competence which caused it to be mistaken
as is glaringly evident in the contrast between the two
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contractor site visits prior to construction.

Material quality

in the pit was adequate, unfortunately, Appellants lacked the
ability to perform.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision to sustain the Trial Court is
correct.

Appellants simply did not act reasonably in the conduct

of its pre-bid site visit or competently in its performance of
the work.
Sheet 2B of the Plans and 44 of the Special Provisions
are not misleading to a reasonable, prudent, and "competent" contractor.

"Competent" in this instance means a contractor posses-

sed of "local common knowledge" of the area, of conditions to be
expected in a limestone pit, and it also means a contractor possessed of adequate know-how and equipment to produce a product.
Respondent does not agree that this Court's holding in
I&iiri} is applicable to this case.

To the extent that it may

apply, the facts would appear to require its use against
Appellants on the issue of reliance.

UDOT's verbal representa-

tions are opposite to that which the Court found in Thorn.
If the Court elects to change its Opinion of April 1,
it should be confined to an affirmation of the trial Court's
Conclusion that the Plans and Specifications do not misrepresent
site conditions.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of July, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Utah Attorney General
LELANb D./FORD /
^-—
1
Assistant
Attorney
General
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This is to certify that two copies each of the
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APPENDIX

STATEMENT QF THE NATURE QF THE CASE
Appellant, Jack B. Parson Construction Co* ("Parson")r
a general contractor, failed to produce bituminous surface
course (asphalt) in accordance with contract requirements on
a project situated on Interstate Highway 70 in Emery County.
Parson alleged its failure was caused by an inadequate
materials source and that the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) had misrepresented said materials source.
Parson demanded that UDOT issue a supplemental agreement to
compensate for its added costs.

After a period of nego-

tiations it became clear that no resolution was possible
due to demands by Parson considered as unreasonable by UDOT.
UDOT then ordered Parson to proceed to perform the contract
under threat of default.

Parson failed to proceed and UDOT

declared the contract in default.

Parson then sued UDOT

alleging its faiulre to issue a supplemental agreement was a
breach of contract and UDOT counterclaimed alleging Parson
to be in default.

UDOT also filed a third party action

against Parson's surety under its performance and payment
bonds.

Each of the parties sought a determination by the

lower Court of its legal position and alternatively an award
of damages.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a trial to the Court in excess of three weeks
duration, with numerous witnesses and over 200 exhibits, the
trial judge found in favor of Respondent and ruled that
Parson had defaulted the contract and was liable to tJDOT for
damages.

The Court al$o ruled that the Aetna Casualty and

Surety Co. ("Aetna"), who had issued payment and performance
bonds, was, together with Parson, liable to UDOT for its
damages to be determined in a later hearing. *
RELIEF SOUGRT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an Order affirming the District Court
Judgment which it believes to be well founded in both
factual determinations made by the Honorable Peter F. Leary
and the legal determinations based thereon.
^

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves close questions of construction

contract law which turn on a careful analysis of specific

*

Note:

The Court's Memorandum Decision is dated
September 11, 1980. Written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and a Formal Judgment were
signed and filed of record on March 24, 1981.
UDOT thereafter relet the construction contract
to another contractor selected by competitive
bid on the 7th day of July, 1981. Construction
was completed in late 1982 and further action by
UDOT to recover damages awaits the outcome of
this appeal.
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facts.

Appellant's Statement of Facts contains inac-

curacies, irrelevant'material and requires this supplement
to make certain that the Court clearly understands the
strong factual as well as legal basis of the trial Court's
ruling.
One key provision often found in construction
cases is a "differing site conditions" provision which
f

determines what happens when actual site conditions
encountered are other than represented.

The contract

involved herein ("contract") does not contain such a
provision contrary to Appellant's assumption.

Under UDOT

specifications, a contractor is allowed relief only when
there is a "change in the plans or in the character of
construction" which is directed by the engineer. (Ex. 1-P,
Section 104.02(4), Tr. 1201-1202)

No change of this nature

was recognized by UDOT in this case.
The contract required the placement of 5" of bituminous surface course (asphalt) with at least 2 1/2" to
be placed by October 15, 1978. Liquidated damages of
$300.00 per calendar day are specified for failure to meet
said date.

(Ex. 3-P)

Prospective bidders are not obligated to use either
material site on Sheet 2B, and test data shown is also
subject to a disclaimer provision.

(Ex. 1-P, Sec. 106.02)
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Prospects 1 and 2 were previously determined to be
acceptable in accordance with UDOTfs requirements for this
project and for earlier projects and were used successfully
by other contractors.

(Tr. 1020-1023, Sheet 2Br Ex. 2-P)

PFE-SIP ACTIVITIES hW BIP
Contract provisions charge Appellant with knowledge of
anything apparent from'a site visit.

The contractor by

submitting a bid warrants that he has "satisfied himself of
actual conditions to be encountered.11
102.05)

(Ex. 1-P, Sec.

UDOT merely stated that the "quality" of materials

was suitable "in general" and warned that furnished
information was only "representative" and that "variations"
should be considered "usual" and are to be "expected." (Ex.
1-P, Sec.

106.02)

A federal engineer familiar with UDOT

specifications, this contract in particular, and how
other States provide pre-bid information stated that UDOT's
information regarding Pit 2 was "fairly minimal." (Tr. 1256,
1257)

He stated that Appellant "should have sought more

information."

(Tr. 1262)

The phrase "acceptable in

general" is not a guarantee and does not require UDOT to
"bear the risk" of a contractors failure to successfully
use the described material.

(Appellant's "Facts," P. 3)

Appellant's pre-bid examination of the project was negligent
and superficial.

This was recognized in conversation by its

-4-
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founder Jack B. Parsonr Sr. while talking to Duane Kern and
overheard by UDOTfs Engineer Jerry Mecham ("Mecham") prior
to any work.

(Tr. 1290-1292)

Appellant's General Manager

and Vice President John Mont Wilson ("Wilson") did not
inquire who "previous contractors" were that had used
Prospects 1 and 2 referred to in UDOT documents, or inquire
as to previous problems or experience with these pits.
414).

(Tr.

Wilson and Appellant's Materials Engineer Dean

McDonald ("McDonald") visited the construction site prior to
bidding but did not request that Mecham be present during
their site visit, a practice often followed.

(Tr. 444-445)

Appellant had never worked in the project area before, (Tr.
418) and Wilson likewise lacked experience in or knowledge
of the area.

(Tr. 418-419)

Wilson had been specifically

warned of difficulties with Prospects 1 and 2 approximately
a year earlier by Eldred Swappf a retired UDOT Engineer.
***

Swapp said the pits would require adding a supplementary
material according to his unrebutted testimony.
1468)

(Tr. 1467-

Mecham said he informed Wilson by telephone prior to

bid opening that previous contractors had to blend sandy
"filler" material into the aggregate to meet specifications.
(Tr.

1285-1287r 1293) Wilson denied that Mecham so in-

formed him and claimed he first learned of it at the preconstruction conference.

(Tr. 1752-1753)

Wilson admitted

that he registered no objection or protest about this
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crucial point at the said conference.
133-D)

(Tr. 1782-1785 & Ex.

Both Wilson and McDonald were former DDOT employees,

knew the type of UDOT records available, where they could be
obtained, and that the contract invited a bidder to inspect
them.

(Tr. 417 - Wilson and 635-639 - McDonald & Ex. 3-P,

Spec. Provision, "Bidding Requirements & Conditions, Sec.
102.05 as changed therein.)

Two contractors previously used

Prospect 2, one used Prospect 1 and their records were
available in Price and Salt Lake City.

Appellant's

superficial pre-bid investigation is evident in the
testimony of McDonald.

He stated there was "much

discussion" concerning the test results on Sheet 2B with
Wilson and what they meant.

(Tr. 517) McDonald said he

tried calling Respondent's District Materials Engineer Al
Spensko ("Spensko") but failed to reach him.

He neither

identified himself nor requested Spensko to return his
telephone call.

He admitted he knew Spensko would have

information concerning the pits and area geology.

Although

unfamiliar with the area, he apparently was not seeking
geologic information.

He said he knew that Prospect 2 was

located in the Moenkopi geologic formation which is well
known to geologists.

(Tr. 634-642)

Published geologic data

of the area described this formation in detail.

(Ex. 147-D)

Available UDOT publications detailed it as well.

(Ex. 191-P

and 192-P)

Said publications describe one of the members of
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that formation as the "Sinbad limestone."

Spensko and Swapp

who are both graduate geologists confirmed that Pit 2 was
primarily made up of the "Sinbad limestone."
1472-1480)

(Tr. 1090f

Variations in this geologic layer were explained

by another geologist.

(Tr. 1720-1721)

McDonald, although a

geologist, did not discover this available information or
its implications.
**

McDonald claimed at trial that Appellant relied on
Sheet 2B and the gradations shown thereon.

His testimony in

a prior deposition was, however, directly contrary to this
and indicated an almost total disregard for this information.

(Tr. 541, 666-667)

Appellant's Statement of Facts

App. - Facts) claims "heavy reliance" on UDOTfs repre*

sentation in Sheet 44 (Ex. 3-P) that Pit 2 was "acceptable
in general" and then asserts that other contractors also
relied on such representation.

(Tr.

1604)

The reference

to tlie transcript by Appellant is a qualified statement by
an experienced engineer executive concerning the type of
tests a contractor relies upon and those which they do not
rely upon.

(See Tr.

1600-1604)

Other contractors who

testified indicated little, if any, reliance on the said
gradation information.

Altogether they show how misplaced

and incompetent Appellant's claimed reliance on such
information was.

(Tr. 1580-1586; 1632; 1892-1893)

Spensko

explained that UDOT does not make an effort to present
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information concerning gradation results which a contractor
can necessarily correlate to.

(Tr.

1529-1531)

Appellant correctly points out that its bid was less
than five percent below the next low bidder (Tr. 238), but
neglects to add that it was approximately 11% under the
engineerfs estimate, or that the contractor who previously
used Pit 2 to pave the highway originally was the highest of
six bidders.
Appellant.

Its bid vfas more than $650r000 higher than
(Ex. 6-P)

Appellant lacked experience with limestone ledge rock
pits.

(Tr. 629-630)

Such pits often create excess minus

200 material; [Minus 200 material is extremely fine grained
like flour.

The material will pass a screen with 200

openings per lineal inchf hence the reference to "minus
200."]; limestones vary in grade and in hardness.

(Tr.

1720-1721, 1090)
Appellant erroneously assumed that neither Pit 1 nor
Pit 2 contained sufficient material for the entire job
(P. 7, App. -

Facts), but were told before commencing

operations in Pit 2 that Pit 1 could be expanded to obtain
all material from said pit.

(Exs. 132-D & 133-D, Tr. 470-

471)

PERFORMANCE BY CONTRACTOR
A required DDOT test to determine acceptability of
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-

direction of removal of material in a pit or a requirement
to even use either Pit 1 or 2,

Appellant can use any source

it selects, subject only to UDOT's right to test material
for its suitability.

(Sec. 106.02f Ex. 1-P)

Appellant was late moving its crushing equipment on
site and in commencing to pave.

(Ex. 133-D, Tr. 263)

first pavement was placed October 5, 1978.

The

(Tr. 263)

Contract provisions restrict paving after October 15.
3-P, Sec. 403.11)

Appellant sought and received permission

to extend this deadline under certain conditions.
P and 14-P)

(Ex.

(Exs. 12-

Appellant failed to meet contract requirements

both as to gradation of material and asphalt content based
on random samples of in place material.
P)

(Exs. 37-P and 38-

Appellant's main difficulty was a deficiency of

aggregate which would pass a number 16 screen (16 openings
per inch) and be retained on a 50 screen (50 openings per
inch) or in an excess of material passing the 200 screen.
(Exs. 37-P and 38-P)

If adjustments were made to reduce the

minus 200 material it threw the material between the 16 and
50 screen out and vice versa. (Ex. 37-P and 38-P)

This

resulted in reduced payment for the item under contract
formula which allows the contractor the option to remove and
replace the material or to accept payment at a reduced unit
price if the calculated pay reduction is not more than 30%
of the full unit price.

If the calculated reduction is over

-10-
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30% and less than 50%r the "engineer" has the option to
order removal of the product or allow it to remain in place.
(Ex. 3-P, Special Provision Sheets 30-40)
The average of individual tests of material in stockpile indicated a possibility of achieving specification
gradation requirements*

(Ex. 41-P)

However large amounts

of material with high amounts of fine sized material,
r
r

represented by individual samples in both piles, which
exceeded the overall average could not have been expected to
combine successfully.
D)

(Tr. 455f 1303-1313, Exs. 201-D, 204-

Mecham warned Appellant of adverse problems to be

expected later in recombining the stockpiles due to their
borderline make-up.

(Tr. 1306-1309, 1320, 1321)

Wilson

admitted that Appellant intentionally builds borderline
stockpiles to maximize production and that this limits the
capability to recombine the stockpiles and achieve gradation
specifications.

(Tr. 419-422)

not uniform in their make-up.

Appellant's stockpiles were
There is over a 9 percentage

point variation in the percent of minus 200 material passing
the finest and most critical screen as revealed by individual stockpile tests.

(Tr. 1440-1442, Ex. 204-D)

This is

further illustrated by comparing a graphic plot of Parson's
tests with those of two adjoining projects constructed at
the same time by other contractors where uniformity is
clearly evident.

[Ex. 219-D (Parson), Ex. 220-D & 221-D,
-11-
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Tr. 1440-1445 for detailed explanation.]

Part of this lack

of uniformity was caused by the manner in which the
stockpiles were constructedr which resulted in degradation
and segregation.

(Tr. 1108-1111, 1391-1398)

Appellant's

stockpiles were so borderline in their make-up due to lack
of care by Appellant in their construction that they were
into the limits of deviation allowed for contract compliance
without any further breakdown of material normally caused by
handling in mixing, hauling, placing and partially
compacting, all of which occurs before compliance testing.
(Tr. 1306-1309, 1353)

Appellant's Fact Statement complains

of "as much as 50% waste." Wilson's testimony to the
contrary was that the overall average waste was 35 to 40
percent.

(Tr.

439)

Waste amounts as high as 50% are

normal in District 4 (Southeastern Utah) according to
Spensko.

(Tr.

1520)

Contractors experienced in that area

of the State confirm this.

(Tr. 1625, 1635, 1866-1868)

The

previous contractor using Pit 2 experienced 25% waste with
very careful control.

(Tr. 1626-1627)

Appellant claims to

i

have expended "elaborate and costly" attempts to achieve
compliance.

(App. - Facts)

Unfortunately none of these

things worked, but Wilson admitted to a number of techniques
that would probably have worked.

(Tr. 457-459)

\

UDOT sug-

gested a blend sand, but Appellant's lack of know-how was
again demonstrated.

(Tr. 460-463, 1333-1342, Ex. 208-D).
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Appellant's whole crushing operation suffered from lack of
know-how.

For instance, the reject system they designed to

achieve a better product resulted in rejection of material
of which 63% would have been in compliance*
Ex. 205-D)

(Tr. 1322-1329,

On production days 5, 6, and 7, a mathematical

analysis of the material put into the plant results in an
expected product with 12.5% minus 200 which is what actual
r
f

test results revealed, but which is unfortunately well above
specification limits.

(Tr. 1342-1343, Ex. 143-P)

Contrary

to Appellant's assertions this would indicate no breakdown.
(App. - Facts)

Appellant was within compliance on produc-

tion days 4 and 5 but made further adjustments and was again
out of compliance.

(Ex. 38-P)

Appellant refers to two problems, "excessive waste" and
"breakdown" of material.

(App. - Facts)

As pointed out

above, "waste" was probably normal for the area and "breakdown" was either not occurring or it was being controlled by
Appellant's efforts.
Appellant operated a total of 7 days in two weeks
trying to produce an acceptable paving product.

It shut

down operations on October 20, 1978.
Appellant's demand for a Supplemental Agreement of
October 17, 1978 (Ex. 15-P) was not answered in writing
until February 1, 1979.

(Ex. 16-P)

occurred during the interim.
-13-

Frequent discussion

(Tr. 1343)

Respondent's
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offers and concessions during the Winter of 1978-1979 were
all attempts at compromise without jeopardy to the public or
other bidders as explained by Bert Taylor ("Taylor").

(Tr.

1171-1174, Ex. 105-P, Ex. 22-P)
One of ODOTfs concessions was to core drill Prospect 2
to determine its make-up.

Appellant refers to the presence

of 35 feet of overburden as revealed by these cores, but
fails to mention that they were obtained some 400 feet east
of the existing face of the pit.

(Tr. 1064-1065, Ex. 40-P)

Appellant's Superintendent knew where the "good material"
existed before any work commenced since it was then visible.
He further must have known that it might be necessary to go
as deep as 36 feet "to obtain better rock." (Tr. 1298f Ex.
111-P)

Appellant's drilling company was apparently

instructed to drill to this level as well.
1302[

(Tr. 1301f

Testimony and photographic exhibits established that

material in Pit 2 was deposited in layers and that
additional layers of material are encountered as removal
proceeds to the east and that the general trend of all the
layers is a dip to the northeast which together with the
added layers accounts for increasing amounts of unknown
material over the identified harder material as operations
moved eastward.

(Tr. 1080-1081)

Photographs in evidence

show a considerable quantity of large rocky material in
waste piles which Appellantfs crushing system would not
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handle.

(Tr. 1437, 1438f Exs.

216-D, 217-D)

This material

was not reduced sufficiently by blasting and was apparently
similar to the material in the north face of Prospect 2.
(Ex. 124-P)

Investigation showed that material with low

wear test results began at a depth of about 15 feet in Pit
No. 2 as the face existed after Appellant shut down
operations in October 1978, and this became the basis of
Respondent's offer to assist the Appellant by voluntarily
paying for removal of the top 15 feet of material.

(Tr.

920-924, 1047-1050, 1052, 1154-1156, Exs. 82-P, 114-P,
185-D)
Appellant's reference to an inadequate quantity of
material in Prospect 1 has been earlier referred to as
erroneous since it was discussed in the preconstruction
conference.

(Exs. 132-D and 133-D)

One bidding contractor

planned to use Prospect 1 for all the material.

(Tr. 1580-

l58^)
Appellant criticizes UDOT for lack of testing in the
BLM property adjoining Prospect 2 on the North.
Facts)
1080)

Spensko explained why it was not necessary. (Tr.
Taylor concurred in this decision.

further cites delay in its availability.

*

(App. -

*

Appellant

(Ex. 29-P)

It

UDOT subsequently let a contract to another contractor
who completed this project in 1981 and 1982 and the
"BLM" Property was successfully used by that contractor
to complete the work.
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is clear that Appellant could have used the "BLM Property"
if they had so desired prior to formal written permission.
(Ex. 30-P)

Formal permission was received before Appellant

walked off the job (Ex. 32-P), but Appellant wanted a
guarantee as to the quality of the material which Respondent refused to provide.

(Exs. 31-P, 33-P, Tr. 386)

Appellant alleges the Respondent refused toflbudge,f and
grant a Supplemental Agreement.

The evidence is to the

contrary and shows Appellant to be the one who wouldnft
"budgefw but instead consistently held out for more and more
concessions.

Taylor's testimony clearly illustrates this.

(Tr. 1150-1193)

See also Exhibits 13-P, 15-P, 16-P, 18-P,

20-P, 21-P, 22-P, 23-P, 25-P, 26-Pf 28-P, 29-P, 30-P, 31-P,
32-P and 33-P)

INFORMATION NOT REVIEWED BY APPELLANT
Appellant alleges undisclosed information in possession
of UDOT contradicted Sheets 2B and 44.

Specifically Appel-

lant alleges undisclosed test data which reveal high wear
percentages on the L. A. Rattler Tests.

UDOT had complete

records of two previous contracts which utilized Prospect 2
and additional investigatory tests of the pit and of the
nearby "west area." (Ex. 77-P)

The location of this

information was disclosed to bidders.
Provission Sec. 102.05)

(Ex. 3-Pf Spec.

Wilson and McDonald admitted they

-16-
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knew it existed but chose to ignore it.

(Tr. 417, 635-639)

Pit 2 as viewed by Appellant was located on the north side
of the highway.

Earlier contractors started several hundred

feet south and moved north and removed an exposed rocky
material.

(Tr. 855,"856f 862, 934, 1458, Ex.

76-P)

Appellant now refers to isolated test results in a large
mass of available information which Appellant earlier chose
to ignore which show L. A. Rattler results with a wear
percentage greater than 40%. Pit 2 had already demonstrated
that it can produce specification material.

(Ex. 22-P)

It

was established that L.A. Wear test results of the same
sample of material can vary by as much as 3%.
Ex. 81-P, 184-D)

(Tr. 927-930,

It was also shown that since Sheet 2B

disclosed an L.A. Rattler wear percentage as high as 39%, it
was reasonable to assume the pit contained material with a
wear in excess of 40%.

(Tr. 1260, 1531, 1599-1601)

A high

wear percentage is considered an advantage since it
indicates "easy crushing."

(Tr. 1591-1593, 1624)

however, require care in crushing the material.
1596)

It does,
(Tr. 1594-

Spensko explained why Pits 1 and 2 were designated by

Respondent and that there was no known alternative.
1012-1016)

(Tr.

Swapp's report concerning Pit 2, which Appellant

refers to, was available on request to anyone and Wilson and
McDonald knew State procedures required its preparation.
(Ex. 89-P)

Sheet 2B and its high L.A.

-17-

Rattler percentages

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

meant essentially the same as Swapp's comments in his
report to DDOT to a knowledgeable contractor since W.W.
Clyde elected to avoid Pit 2 and planned to get all material
out of Pit 1.

(Tr. 1583-1587)

Wear factors shown on Sheet

2B for Pit 1 are not as high as Pit 2.

UDOT's 1975 tests

showing a high quantity of minus 200 material which Appellant complains about were taken some 800 to 1000 feet
west of Appellant's work area and of the location of Test
1A.

(Tr. 1007)

The 1975 tests do not indicate that they

were "crushed ledge rock" as Test 1A does.

(Ex. 77-P)

Test

1A, according to McDonald, matches the average of Tests lr
2, 3 and 4 on Sheet 2B.

(Tr. 543)

Spensko testified his

intention was to show information on Sheet 2B which would
illustrate what the contractor could expect to get from
material in the exposed rock faces on the north and east.
The 1969 tests and the one 1978 test are consistent and
Spensko's decision not to do further testing as required by
DDOT's materials manual for a new pit is realistic.
92-P, Tr.

1000-1013, 1021-1022)

(Ex.

Spensko further explained

the problem with displaying historical information was in
part due to a specification change which would affect its
value.

(Tr. 1028-1029)

The "good" material was the exposed

rock ledges which is obvious from photographs.

(Tr. 808-

811, Exs. 174-D, 175-D, 177-D)
Appellant raises concern over a wear test with a result
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of 46.7% taken from its stockpile by the State and dated
September 22, 1978. The State employee who performed this
test explained that he performed it for his own information
and that no one else was informed of the result since the
test was not performed according to UDOTfs prescribed procedure.

(Ex. 80-P, 187-D, Tr. 883-901, 936-937)

The said

test result is marked "cleaned with air," and it was
established that sample! cleaned in this manner show higher
percentages of breakdown than those performed according to
prescribed procedures.
Exs. 189-D, 190-D)

(As much as 4.5%+)

(Tr. 1493-1495,

This information also explains why

Appellantfs test results conducted by an independent
laboratory yielded higher percentages than State results on
comparable material and served to invalidate them insofar as
comparing results with State test results.

(Ex. 16-P, Tr.

1537-1538)
-"Appellant refers to Taylor's letter of February 7 f 1979
to FHWA as an admission by UDOT that Sheets 2E and 44
"incorrectly identified" materials in Prospect 2.
"C")

(App.

Taylor explained this conclusion was made before he

was fully informed.

Taylor further explained that UDOT had

really "not identified" the material in question and that
the term "incorrectly identified" was really not accurate.
(Tr. 1173-1174, 1186, 1205-1210, Ex. 101-P)

FHWA's letter

to Taylor commenting on this matter was acknowledged as
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correct by Taylor and it in essence points out the need for
further pre-bid investigation by the contractor.
P)

(Ex. 102-

UDOT had made no effort to analyze the east face of Pit

2 except for one test (lAf Sheet 2B) since it was not known
what a contractor might elect to do in Pit 2 or whether Pit
1 would be selected.

UDOT had correctly identified Pit 2 as

a whole and did not identify any one part of the pit or any
part not readily capable of visual observation.

(Tr. 966-

1000)
Appellant's reference to Spensko's investigation of Pit
2 as "sloppy test procedures" (App. - Facts) is hypocritical.

This was the third project to use Pit 2.

Spensko

selected an area to testf and the results confirmed previous
test results of similar formations (Tr. 1029); two contractors had already successfully used Pit 2, and there
was extensive information available to anyone interested in
viewing it.

Additional tests would have been superfluous.

Appellant chose to ignore UDOT's invitation to examine other
available written information and ignored direct verbal
communication warning of potential difficulties.

(Tr. 1467-

1468f Spec. Prov. amending Sec. 102.05 of Standard Spec. Ex. 3-P)

Appellant's lack of care in its pre-bid examina-

tion is the "sloppy proceduref" if there is one.

(Tr. 799-

802)
Appellantfs claim that Spensko failed to mention that
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Prospect 2 contained silt stone and sandstone assumes that
there was a duty to do so.

Since this material was easily

visible and in addition is described in published geologic
literature, Appellant could easily have acquired that
knowledge.

(Tr. 1090, 1092, 1095-1096, 1720, 1721, Exs.

191-P and 192-P; 180-D and 195-D)
Appellant presented two geologists who viewed the site
after it was blasted and considerable material had been
removed.

(Waggoner & Osborne)

Their statements concerning

"drastic changes in quality in a short distance" and a
"possible fault" contrast with Respondent's geologist
witnesses; Swapp who worked the previous contract and who is
well acquainted with the San Rafael area (Tr. 1455, 1465);
Al Spensko who has worked in the area for years (Tr. 10921095, Ex. 176-D); and William Lund, who did not view the pit
but had extensive experience in quarry operations with
limestone rock.

(Tr.

1723-1727)

These geologists saw

little evidence of any "drastic change," or faulting.
Waggoner was reluctant to admit the obvious presence of a
well marked and defined layer of rock obvious in two
different photographs since it contradicted his "drastic
change in quality" and "possible fault" theory.
and 231-D, Tr. 1811-1813)

(Exs. 222-D

There was also some question

concerning the exact geologic strata Pit 2 was located in.
Powell (a UDOT geologist in charge of the core drilling)
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mistakenly labeled the limestone as Kaibab. (Ex. 40-P)
Spensko identified it as the Sinbad limestone member of the
Moenkopi (Tr. 1083, 1090, 1092), Swapp confirmed Spenskofs
conclusion.

(Tr. 1465-1466, 1471-1475)

A careful analysis

of all this geologic testimony and documentary evidence
merely establishes that the same material used by previous
contractors to successfully construct two previous projects
existed in the area of the pit that Appellant chose to work
in but that it was covered by added layers of different
material which Appellant made no effort to dispose of or
adequately deal with in its crushing operation.
1464.)

(Tr. 1461-

These added layers were equally visible to both

parties.

(Tr.

1298-1302, Ex. 111-P)

Pit 2 contained suitable material but required careful
quality control in aggregate production.

Appellant's manner

of operation is not the responsibility of Respondent.
Johnson by contrast was careful and selective in the
material and methods it used and succeeded where Appellant
failed.

(Tr. 1460-1461, 1464)

Pit 2 was "acceptable in general" as Respondent states
in Sheet 44. Appellant is responsible for producing an
acceptable product if it elects to use said source, and
Respondent has specifically disclaimed any responsibility
for Appellant's decisions based on such information.
Facts in evidence support the specific findings of the
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District Court that information supplied was accurate and
that Appellant's problems were related to its methods of
production, handling and storing of aggregate material.

ARGUMENT
I
APPELLANT'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO RELY ON PREBID REPRESENTATIONS IS UNREASONABLE BOTH
LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY.
A.

RESPONDENT'S DISCLAIMER IS VALID

Appellant asserts that this case is controlled by this
Court's decision in Thorn Construction Co. Inc. v. UDOT, 598
P.2d 365 (Utah 1979).

Appellant refers to language therein

quoted and which originates in a leading case on pre-bid
reliance upon written information which is Souza & McCue

Construction Co. v. Superior Court of San Benito County, 57
Cal.2d 508f 20 Cal. Reptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338f 339 (1962),
The general proposition Appellant relies upon is that:
A contractor of public works who, acting
resonablyP is misled by incorrect plans and
specifications issued by the public authorities
as the basis for bids and who, as a result submits
a bid which is lower than he would have otherwise
madef may recover in a contract action for extra work
or expenses necessitated by the conditions being
other than represented..,. (Emphasis added)
This exact language is quoted by this Court with
approval in the case of SchOCKer Constr> Co, Yt State Of
iitalU 619 P.2d 1378 (1980).
The facts of this case show that Respondent in its
-23-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

solicitation for bids provided certain "minimal information"
(Ex. 2-P, Sheet 2B and Ex. 3-P, Sheet 44, Tr. 1256-1257)
regarding two materials prospects often referred to as Pits
1 & 2.

Appellant's Vice President and General Manager Mont

Wilson selected Pit 2 after a site visit and a brief
conversation with Respondent's engineer in charge of the
project, Jerry Mecham.

(Tr. 223-232)

Appellant seeks t6 place the entire responsibility
for its failure to produce a specification product upon
Respondent when its choice of Pit 2 was its ownf the
direction of material removal was its ownf the selection
of equipment and method of removal of material was its
own, all without any control or direction of Respondent.
(Sec. 106.02r Ex. 1-P, Spec. Prov.f Sec. 102.05, Ex. 3-P)
Respondent's written representations on Sheet 2B
specifically refer to Section 106.02 of its Standard
Specifications entitled "Local Material Sources." (Ex. 1-P)
This provision is referred to as a "disclaimer" and puts a
contractor on notice that while the materials in a
"designated source" may be "acceptable in generalf" the
contractor shall "determine for himself the amount of
equipment and work required to produce a material meeting
specifications."

It further qualifies sample information

and warns that variations are both "usual" and "are to be
expected."

-24-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

